Reticenţele lui Noica faţă de Heidegger

  • Sorin Lavric University of Bucharest
Keywords: logic, narration, idea, Heidegger, Noica

Abstract

Noica’s objections concerning Heidegger’s philosophy are not many and are to be found especially in two books: The Philosophical Diary from 1944 and The Treatise of Ontology from 1981. The most substantial of these objections claims that Heidegger’s philosophy can’t be narrated and that Heidegger doesn’t end his philosophy with Logic. In addition to the discussion of these objections, the paper presents five more objections of its author; namely, that Heidegger uses the tactics of endlessly postponing the approach of a problem, that he introduces purely philological distinctions as conceptual distinctions, that he pursues word-games as a goal in itself, that he appeals to purely verbal paradoxes and that he doesn’t say anything new, but known old things in a new, peculiar language.

Published
2005-08-25
Section
Articles